Foreign affairs, defence and the Cocos Islands

Fraser's Foreign Minister Tony Street briefed Cabinet on relations with Indonesia in July 1982. He reported that differences in social and political values were becoming increasingly apparent, especially in the media. This was the greatest obstacle to improved relations and there was little hope of change until the Indonesian media became less sensitive and the Australian media more understanding. Indonesia was unlikely to allow resident Australian journalists back into the country in the near future, although Indonesian irritation with Radio Australia had diminished. Cabinet decided on a major increase in aid to Indonesia, with emphasis on cultural and youth exchanges, medical assistance for East Timor, and visits by appropriate Indonesian leaders. News attitudes would be discussed with senior Australian editors.

ALP Foreign Minister Bill Hayden briefed Cabinet on Indonesia in March 1983. He noted the deep feeling in the ALP about the Indonesian annexation of East Timor, but pointed out that the ALP was now in government and must assess sensibly what it could do about an annexation that had taken place six years ago and was now widely accepted diplomatically, including by Australia. An attempt by Australia to reverse its position on East Timor would not only fail, but would prompt a punitive response from Indonesia on issues such as the seabed treaty, refugee boats and transit rights. It might also lead to tensions over Cocos and Christmas Islands and along the Papua New Guinea border. Hayden was authorised to make a public statement noting that East Timor had been incorporated in Indonesia, but expressing deep concern that an internationally-supervised act of self-determination had not taken place. The statement would call for increased access to East Timor by relief agencies, human rights groups and the media, and note that Australia would seek information from Indonesia about the killing of the five Australian-based journalists in East Timor in 1975. Hayden visited Jakarta in April 1983 and incorporated elements of the policy in media briefings.

The Fraser Government reviewed relations with China in 1982 and found them generally satisfactory, although there was some concern that the next generation of Chinese leaders might be more inward-looking. Australia generally agreed with China on international issues, although there were differences over Cambodia and on some aspects of United States policy. The Hawke Government decided in principle to resume aid to Vietnam, but not to reveal the policy publicly until after the United States, China and ASEAN had been consulted. Australia would give humanitarian and infrastructure aid to Cambodia, but not recognise either the Vietnamese-backed government or the rival Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean focused attention on Cocos and Christmas Islands. In November 1982 Territories Minister Tom McVeigh reported that the Cocos Malay community had indicated a clear preference for integration with Australia, as opposed to independence or free association with Australia or some other country. The gradual deterioration of Australia’s position in the United Nations (UN) Decolonisation Committee made it desirable to move Cocos towards a UN-supervised act of self-determination, which would hopefully endorse integration and take Cocos out of UN jurisdiction. In the short term, relevant Australian legislation, including that relating to health and social security, would be extended to Cocos and electors would be enrolled to vote in Australian elections. The Hawke Government agreed that both Cocos and Christmas Islands were of enduring strategic value and should be integrated with Australia to deny access to a potentially hostile power. The act of self-determination should proceed for Cocos, but an act was not required for Christmas Island because there was no indigenous population. Hawke offered the Cocos Islanders some additional assistance and decided to purchase the remaining property of the Clunies-Ross family, if necessary by compulsion. The act of self-determination was held in 1984 and endorsed integration with Australia.

The search for a replacement for the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne finally ended. Cabinet had agreed in 1980 to purchase a new carrier for anti-submarine helicopters and potentially also for short take-off/vertical landing aircraft, although there were conflicting views about its value. Supporters said that it was essential for the control of Australia’s sea approaches and trade routes, but opponents argued that it would be too vulnerable and that its tasks could be covered by submarines, long-range aircraft and frigates carrying helicopters. In February 1982 Cabinet decided to buy the Royal Navy carrier Invincible for $478 million, but the British withdrew the offer in July 1982 after the Falkland Islands war. The British offered a new Invincible-class carrier for $760 million, with an option to buy or lease the older carrier Hermes until the new carrier arrived in 1989. Defence Minister Ian Sinclair recommended that the British offer be refused and Melbourne disposed of, but Cabinet decided in February 1983 that the offer should be fully evaluated. The Hawke Government did not give further consideration to the carrier issue.

The election of the Hawke Government led to a review of some aspects of the strategic relationship with the United States. The ALP platform required that the North-West Cape naval communications station should not be allowed to involve Australia in hostilities without Australian consent. The Defence Committee believed that the existing arrangements for protecting Australian sovereignty were the most we were likely to achieve, but Cabinet was not convinced and decided that Hawke and Hayden should discuss with US officials how we might be more closely informed about operations at North-West Cape.

The Hawke Government also reaffirmed its commitment to the ANZUS Treaty, but noted that Australia should not assume that ANZUS would guarantee US military support in any situation in which Australia might find itself. Hawke outlined Australia’s views in Washington in June, and Hayden and Defence Minister Gordon Scholes persuaded the July ANZUS Council meeting to undertake the first review of ANZUS since 1951. They reported that the United States had stressed that any armed attack on an ANZUS member would bring a prompt response from other members, including a military response if appropriate.

Selected documents

	Series title	Date range	Series number
	[Fraser] Submission 5361, 24 February 1982, Options for improving relations with Indonesia	1982	A12909, 5361
	[Hawke] Submission 12, 23 March 1983, Australian policy on Indonesia – East Timor	1983	A13977, 12
	[Fraser] Submission 5634, 5 July 1982, Australian policy towards China	1982	A12909, 5634
	[Hawke] Submission 15, 20 March 1983, Australian policy on Indo-China	1983	A13977, 15
	[Fraser] Submission 5826, 27 October 1982, Cocos (Keeling) Islands – Act of Self Determination	1982	A12909, 5826
	[Hawke] Submission 451, 29 September 1983, Cocos (Keeling) Islands – Act of Self Determination	1983	A13977, 451
	[Fraser] Submission 5945, 20 January 1983, Seaborne air capability	1983	A12909, 5945
	[Hawke] Submission 179, 25 May 1983, North West Cape Naval Communication Station	1983	A13977, 179
	[Hawke] Submission 170, 24 May 1983, Review of ANZUS	1983	A13977, 170
	[Hawke] Submission 403, 13 September 1983, Review of ANZUS	1983	A13977, 403